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The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, developed in a series of
Supreme Court decisions, exempts parties from antitrust liability
under the Clayton Act' and Sherman Act §§ 1 and 22 when their
alleged anticompetitive behavior involves petitioning any branch
of the government. Under a narrow exception, the doctrine does
not apply to "sham" petitions, that is, petitions that seek protec-
tion under Noerr-Pennington but are actually "nothing more
than... attempt[s] to interfere directly with the business rela-
tionships of a competitor."3 Until recently, however, the Supreme
Court had not definitively set the standard for determining when
a lawsuit or other petitioning activity constitutes a sham. The
Court resolved this question, at least with respect to lawsuits, in
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc.4 A suit may be deemed a sham under the excep-
tion to Noerr-Pennington only if it is objectively baseless, regard-
less of the filing party's subjective intent.'
By answering the question in this way, however, the Profes-
sional Real Estate Investors holding creates a tension between
the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which instructs judges to
examine both the objective merits of a party's suit and the party's
subjective intent in bringing the suit. This tension raises two
significant issues. First, may a court properly sanction a party
under Rule 11 when the party brings an antitrust suit that is not
a sham for the purposes of Noerr-Pennington? Second, and poten-
tially more significant, what implications does the Court's en-
dorsement of the objective-baselessness standard in the antitrust
t A.B. 1992, Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate 1995, The University of Chicago.
1 38 Stat 730 (1914), codified at 15 USC §§ 12-21 (1988 & Supp 1992).
2 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified at 15 USC §§ 1, 2 (1988 & Supp 1992).
' Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 US 127,
144 (1961).
4 113 S Ct 1920 (1993).
5 Id at 1926, 1928.
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context have for Rule 11 jurisprudence, particularly to the extent
that Rule 11 rests on similar rationales for sanctioning certain
forms of behavior?
This Comment addresses the tension between Professional
Real Estate Investors and Rule 11 and argues that, at least in
some contexts, a new interpretation of Rule 11 will be necessary
to resolve the inconsistencies between these areas of the law.
Sections I and II trace, respectively, the development of Noerr-
Pennington immunity and Rule 11 sanctions based on improper
subjective intent. Section III analyzes the doctrinal tension
between the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity and
Rule 11, and suggests that Rule 11 must be curtailed in the
antitrust context. This Comment argues that reinterpreting Rule
11 is both necessary in light of the Court's recent decision in
Professional Real Estate Investors and justified by other consider-
ations inherent in sanctioning mechanisms in antitrust law.
Finally, Section IV examines the implications of Professional Real
Estate Investors for Rule 11 sanctions in other contexts. This
Comment concludes that the same considerations that favor
limiting Rule 11 sanctions in antitrust proceedings are equally
applicable whenever courts perform a function similar to the eco-
nomic regulation of large and complex business enterprises.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
A. Noerr: The Origin of the Doctrine
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc. involved a suit by a group of forty-one trucking
companies against twenty-four eastern railroads and an associa-
tion of their presidents.6 The trucking companies charged that
the railroads were attempting to monopolize the long-haul freight
business and restrain competition in violation of the Sherman
Act.7 The action complained of was a publicity campaign by the
railroads using third parties to turn public opinion against the
interstate trucking industry, influence the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture to pass laws that would economically damage the trucking
industry, and persuade officials to step up the enforcement of
various regulations relating to trucking, all in order to hurt the
truckers as competitors in violation of the Sherman Act.8 The
r 365 US 127, 129 (1961).
7 Id at 129.
8 Id at 129-30. The truckers were especially upset over the railroad's "third-party
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complaint charged that these actions were "vicious, corrupt, and
fraudulent."9
The Supreme Court declined to find a Sherman Act violation
on these facts. There were two bases for this decision: Congress's
intent in passing the Sherman Act, and the First Amendment
implications of sanctioning political activity (in this case, lobby-
ing a legislature)." With respect to the first basis, the Court
acknowledged that such joint lobbying efforts "could per-
haps.., be brought within the general proscription of 'combina-
tion[s] ... in restraint of trade,"' but found that they were not
the type of activities with which the Sherman Act was normally
concerned." Further, to sanction petitioning activity when the
petitioning results in a restraint of trade would "impute to the
Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but
political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever
in the legislative history of that Act." This basis of Noerr
shows the Court's desire to protect the proper functioning of
government by restricting some methods of petitioning the gov-
ernment.
The second foundation for Noerr was the First Amendment
right to petition the government." The Court did not expressly
rule on the constitutionality of construing the Sherman Act to
prohibit petitioning, but nonetheless stated that such an inter-
pretation of the Act "would raise important constitutional ques-
tions. The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the
Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Con-
gress an intent to invade these freedoms.""'
technique," which made the publicity materials appear to come from independent sources
when, in fact, the materials had been "largely prepared... and paid for by the railroads."
' Id at 129. The background of this suit has been described as "a factual context that
reeked with deception, malice, misrepresentation and outright fraud." Maxwell M. Blecher
and Joel R. Bennett, Litigation as an Integral Part of a Scheme to Create or Maintain an
Illegal Monopoly, 26 Mercer L Rev 479, 483 (1975).
'0 Noerr, 365 US 137-38. For a discussion of the relative importance of these two fac-
tors and the principles underlying them, see Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A
Policy at War with Itself 350-51 (Free Press, 2d ed 1993) (originally published in 1978);
Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The
Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U Chi L Rev 80, 94-104 (1977);
Milton Handler and Richard A. De Sevo, The Noerr Doctrine and Its Sham Exception, 6
Cardozo L Rev 1, 3-7 (1984); James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the
First Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 Georgetown L J 65, 78-80 (1985).
" 365 US at 136, quoting the Sherman Act, 15 USC § 1.
12 365 US at 137.
' "Congress shall make no law.., abridging... the right of the people... to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." US Const, Amend I.
" 365 US at 138. The articulation of these two rationales left the lower courts unsure
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These two rationales affect the general applicability of the
Noerr doctrine, in its later form, to other areas of the law, such
as Rule 11. If Noerr is read as a case about the proper function-
ing of government institutions and processes, one aspect of which
would be judicially supervised economic regulation, then argu-
ments from the Noerr line of cases may be analogized to other
situations that implicate similar governmental functions. How-
ever, if Noerr is about protecting the right to petition, its implica-
tions may be more far-reaching. Reading Noerr as a constitution-
al prohibition of certain restrictions on the right to petition would
require a reexamination of restrictions on litigation in all con-
texts.' 5
The other significant element of Noerr was its sham excep-
tion. Instead of granting antitrust defendants an impenetrable
shield against liability, the Court foresaw potential cases in
which petitioning activity could be an antitrust violation. In a
case where the petitioning "is a mere sham to cover what is actu-
ally nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor [ ] the application of the
Sherman Act would be justified."6 The Court also observed that
the railroads' effort to influence legislation not only seemed genu-
ine, but had been "highly successful." 7 However, these state-
ments represented the extent of the Court's discussion of a possi-
ble exception to the rule it had just laid down. The Court failed
to articulate any standards for distinguishing sham petitioning
from legitimate efforts to influence governmental bodies, al-
though the decision appears to express a preference for objective
determinations of motive. In evaluating the truckers' claim that
the railroad presidents' sole motive for the publicity campaign
was to destroy the trucking industry as a competitor-an essen-
whether they should protect some degree of a right to petition or, given the intent of the
Sherman Act, simply refrain from interfering inappropriately with the political process.
See generally Handler and De Sevo, 6 Cardozo L Rev 1 (cited in note 10). See also Stanley
E. Crawford, Jr. and Andy A. Tschoepe 11, The Erosion of the Noerr-Pennington Immuni-
ty, 13 St. Mary's L J 291, 306-26 (1981); Hurwitz, 74 Georgetown L J at 79-80 (cited in
note 10).
' This reading of Noerr would implicate not only Rule 11 as applied to all types of
suits, but also other restrictions on litigation, such as the common law torts of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process. For more discussion of these torts, see text accompany-
ing notes 123-24. See generally Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunity for Concerted
Attempts to Influence Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies to Malicious Prosecu-
tion and Abuse of Process, 86 Harv L Rev 715 (1973); Thomas A. Balmer, Sham Litigation
and the Antitrust Laws, 29 Buff L Rev 39, 65-70 (1980).
16 Noerr, 365 US at 144.
" Id.
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tial part of the district court's holding in favor of the plain-
tiffs-the Court stated that it did "not see how [the defendants'
motive], even if adequately supported in the record, could trans-
form conduct otherwise lawful into a violation of the Sherman
Act."'8
B. Pennington: Reaffirming Noerr
The second major Supreme Court case on the antitrust impli-
cations of attempts to influence government action was United
Mine Workers v Pennington.9 In this case, as in many subse-
quent cases, the antitrust violation was alleged in a counter-
claim." The trustees of the United Mine Workers of America
Welfare and Retirement Fund ("UMW") sued the owners of a coal
company for overdue royalty payments; the defendants counter-
claimed, alleging that the UMW, in conjunction with a group of
large coal producers, had lobbied the Secretary of Labor to obtain
an unusually high minimum-wage requirement for companies
selling coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority."' The Supreme
Court held that the UMW's attempt to influence the Secretary of
Labor was not an unlawful attempt to restrict trade.2
Although the Court did not address the sham exception to
the Noerr doctrine, Pennington is significant in two respects.
First, the Court affirmed the basic rule laid down by Noerr, that
petitioning activity cannot give rise to antitrust liability. The
Court failed, however, to clarify the underlying basis of the doc-
trine, that is, whether the doctrine was grounded in concerns
about the proper functioning of government or in the First
Amendment.' Second, Pennington, like Noerr, contained dicta
rejecting the relevance of intent-and thus favoring an objective
test-for determining whether activity is protected from antitrust
liability. The Court stated that "Noerr shields from the Sherman
Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of
intent or purpose" and that "[jloint efforts to influence public
officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to
18 Id at 138-39.
19 381 US 657 (1965).
' For a survey of the different forms in which the Noerr doctrine and the sham
exception have been litigated, see Handler and De Sevo, 6 Cardozo L Rev at 26-28 (cited
in note 10).
21 Pennington, 381 US at 659-60.
22 Id at 669-70.
' See Fischel, 45 U Chi L Rev at 85 (cited in note 10); Crawford and Tschoepe, 13 St
Mary's L J at 299 (cited in note 14).
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eliminate competition."24 Admittedly, these statements do not
amount to a comprehensive description of which lawsuits will be
protected from antitrust liability. Significantly, however, they
suggest that the Court preferred to think about antitrust viola-
tions in a consequentialist manner, that is, with an eye not to the
intent of the parties, but to the outcome of a governmental pro-
cess.
C. California Motor Transport: Expanding Noerr Immunity
The third major decision developing what has come to be
known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is California Motor
Transport Co. v Trucking Unlimited.' In this case between two
groups of trucking companies, Trucking Unlimited alleged that
California Motor Transport and other large trucking companies
had systematically instituted proceedings against Trucking Un-
limited in order to hinder Trucking Unlimited's efforts to acquire,
transfer, and register operating rights." California Motor Trans-
port significantly extended Noerr to encompass petitioning activi-
ty directed at the judicial branch-that is, lawsuits-yet still left
open the question of whether the sham exception should be based
on a subjective or an objective test.
In its decision, the Court first reaffirmed Noerr and
Pennington, and then held that "[t]he same philosophy governs
the approach of citizens or groups of [citizens] to administrative
agencies ... and to courts, the third branch of Government ....
The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the
right of petition."27 While California Motor Transport relied
heavily on the First Amendment basis for Noerr, and can easily
be read as an extension of the right of petition to all litigation
passing muster under Noerr,' some language in the decision
casts doubt on whether the protection from antitrust liability is
coextensive with First Amendment protection. 9
24 Pennington, 381 US at 670.
n 404 US 508 (1972).
26 Id at 509.
' Id at 510. This language also for the first time applied the antitrust immunity doc-
trine to an individual petitioner, as opposed to a group of individuals or other entities
engaged in joint petitioning.
28 See id at 513. See also Fischel, 45 U Chi L Rev at 88 (cited in note 10); Handler
and De Sevo, 6 Cardozo L Rev at 10-13 (cited in note 10).
2 "Petitioners, of course, have the right of access to the agencies and courts to be
heard on applications sought by competitive highway carriers. That right.., is part of
the right of petition protected by the First Amendment. Yet that does not necessarily give
them immunity from the antitrust laws." 404 US at 513.
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The central questions still unresolved at this point were the
extent of the sham exception and the appropriate test for apply-
ing it. The Court did apply the sham exception in this case, con-
cluding that California Motor Transport's suits had "sought to
bar their competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory
tribunals and so to usurp the decisionmaking process."3' The
lawsuits filed by the defendants were alleged to have been insti-
tuted "with or without probable cause, and regardless of the
merits of the cases."3 One clear result of this holding is that
"there is no constitutional right.., to press baseless claims for
the ulterior purpose of wreaking economic injury upon a competi-
tor."32 However, the Court also spoke of "a purpose to deprive
the competitors of meaningful access to the agencies and
courts."33 To the extent that this language suggests that intent
might be a factor in determining whether the litigation was a
sham, it conflicts with Pennington. However, because California
Motor Transport's claims failed both the objective and the subjec-
tive tests, it is not clear how the Court would have resolved the
case had the claims been well grounded in fact and law.
D. The Objective Baselessness Test
In the wake of California Motor Transport, lower courts were
forced to develop their own standards by which to judge what
constituted sham litigation. Later Supreme Court decisions did
contain dicta supporting an objective test, but the precise issue,
seen most clearly in the conflicting statements in California Mo-
tor Transport, remained unresolved until Professional Real Estate
Investors.
1. The Supreme Court antitrust cases.
Four significant cases decided after California Motor Trans-
port point generally, though not unanimously, toward an objec-
tive standard for distinguishing sham suits from legitimate litiga-
tion. In one case, a minority of justices suggested that subjective
30 Id at 512.
31 Id.
3 Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 359 (cited in note 10). The Court spoke of "a pattern of
baseless, repetitive claims [that] may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that
the administrative and judicial processes have been abused." California Motor Transport,
404 US at 513.
' 404 US at 512. See also id at 518 (Stewart concurring).
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elements were appropriate, while three decisions clearly showed
a tendency to favor objective measures.
In Vendo Co. v Lektro-Vend Corp., a vending machine manu-
facturer sued a former vending machine manufacturer for breach
of a noncompetition agreement that the two parties had entered
into as part of an asset purchase."4 In response, the defendant
filed a counterclaim alleging that the real purpose behind the
breach of contract suit was to "harass" and "eliminate" the defen-
dant as a competitor.35 The heart of the case was whether a sin-
gle state-court action could constitute an antitrust violation. The
Court's brief discussion of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its
sham exception consisted of dicta split in its implications for the
standard for determining shams. Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger, implied that a single
successful state court proceeding could not constitute an antitrust
violation. 6 Four dissenting Justices, on the other hand, stated
that "[t]he mere fact that the Illinois courts concluded that
petitioner's state-law claim was meritorious does not disprove the
existence of a serious federal antitrust violation."37 This case,
along with California Motor Transport, is the furthest the Court
has strayed from an objective test of bad-faith sham litigation in
the antitrust context.38
34 433 US 623, 626-27 (1977).
5 Id.
"' Blackmun stated:
Only one state-court proceeding was involved in this case, and it resulted in the
considered affirmance by the Illinois Supreme Court of a judgment for more than $7
million. In my opinion, therefore, it cannot be said on this record that Vendo was
using the state-court proceeding as an anticompetitive device in and of itself.
Id at 645 (Blackmun concurring in the result).
37 Id at 662 (Stevens dissenting).
' The dissents position, if taken to the extreme, may imply that merit is irrelevant
to the sham determination. See Note, The Sham Exception to the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine, 11 Hastings Const L Q 329, 341 (1984). See also Walker Process Equipment, Inc.
v Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 US 172, 173-77 (1965) (upholding as a valid
antitrust action the counterclaim of a patent infringement defendant that challenged the
enforcement of an expired and fraudulently obtained patent as a restraint of trade). Al-
though devoid of references to Noerr or Pennington, Walker Process indicates that lawsuits
seeking to enforce invalid or fraudulently obtained patents can be valid bases for antitrust
liability. However, because such suits involve both improper intent and objective baseless-
ness, they offer little assistance in answering the questions posed in this Comment. For
an analysis of Walker Process and the antitrust implications of fraud and other crimes
generally, see Blecher and Bennett, 26 Mercer L Rev at 486-87 (cited in note 9); Michael
W. Bien, Litigation as an Antitrust Violation: Conflict Between the First Amendment and
the Sherman Act, 16 USF L Rev 41, 81-83 (1981). But see Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 352-
53 (cited in note 10) (suggesting that Walker Process "took the case outside the exception
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Three other cases decided between California Motor Trans-
port and Professional Real Estate Investors point in the opposite
direction. These cases indicate a tendency of the Supreme Court
to favor objective tests when applying the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine. The first case, following closely on the heels of California
Motor Transport, was Otter Tail Power Co. v United States.' In
Otter Tail, the defendant power company had attempted to pre-
vent the startup of municipal power systems in areas where its
retail distribution franchises had expired. Part of the company's
strategy involved instituting lawsuits to prevent the formation of
municipal systems.' ° The District Court originally found Otter
Tail's litigation to be an antitrust violation."1 But by the time
the case reached the Supreme Court, California Motor Transport
had been decided, and the case was ultimately remanded for reconsid-
eration in light of the extension of the Noerr doctrine to petition-
ing courts.42 The Court described the implications of its exten-
sion of the doctrine in the following terms:
[Tihe principle of Noerr may also apply to the use of admin-
istrative or judicial processes where the purpose to suppress
competition is evidenced by repetitive lawsuits carrying the
hallmark of insubstantial claims and thus is within the
"mere sham" exception announced in Noerr.'
The key term here, of course, is "insubstantial," by which it
seems obvious that the Court means "frivolous," and not "for a
small amount of money." While this is admittedly only dicta, it
both clarifies California Motor Transport and gives another ex-
ample of the Court's tendency to think along objective lines when
engaged in antitrust regulation.
The next case, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v Indian Head,
Inc., was not about petitioning the courts." The original
plaintiff, Indian Head, a manufacturer of plastic electrical con-
duit, brought an antitrust claim against Allied Tube, the largest
producer of steel conduit. Indian Head alleged that Allied Tube
had influenced the National Fire Protection Association, a private
organization that develops product safety standards, to reject a
to Section 2 liability for those who enforce patents, valid or not, in good faith").
3 410 US 366 (1973).
40 Id at 368.
41 United States v Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F Supp 54, 61 (D Minn 1971).
42 Otter Tail, 410 US at 380.
43 Id.
" 486 US 492 (1988).
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proposal to classify plastic conduit as an approved type of electri-
cal conduit.45 The Court denied Noerr-Pennington immunity to
Allied Tube's efforts to sway the NFPA, largely because it was a
private, non-official body, albeit one whose fire-safety product
codes directly influenced state and local governments. 46 Notwith-
standing this holding, the Court noted that Allied's "effort to
influence governmental action in this case certainly cannot be
characterized as a sham given the actual [success of the plan]."4 7
Yet the Court declined to protect all successful attempts to influ-
ence the government.' Noerr immunity, the Court observed,
depends not only on the impact of the anticompetitive activity,
"but also on the context and nature of the activity."49 Allied
Tube, however, shows that the Court continued to think about
sham findings, at least in some contexts, in an objective, out-
come-oriented manner.
City of Columbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. is the
most recent Supreme Court case to discuss the sham exception
yet still leave unresolved the issue of how to identify sham litiga-
tion.5" In Omni, a suit was brought against an advertising com-
pany and a city that had allegedly conspired to restrict billboards
by changing zoning ordinances.5' The Court made no clear state-
ment supporting either a subjective or an objective test for sham
suits, but cited dicta from previous cases, including Noerr,
Pennington, and Allied Tube, that point toward an objective
" Id at 495-97. Electrical conduit is the tubing used to run electrical wires through
walls and floors.
46 Id at 501-502.
47 Id at 502.
48 Id at 503.
" Id at 504. Though petitioning of all three branches of government falls under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, there are differences in the treatment given the various
branches. This is a natural result of the different processes and goals of petitioning in
these areas. It has been suggested, for example, that the courts are more susceptible to
injury from abuse of procedural rules; if true, this would support a clearly defined (and, as
this Comment suggests, objective) policing procedure. For a discussion of some of the
differences between the three branches with regard to petitioning activity, see Bork,
Antitrust Paradox at 359-64 (cited in note 10); Fischel, 45 U Chi L Rev at 104-10 (cited in
note 10); Handler and De Sevo, 6 Cardozo L Rev at 18-33 (cited in note 10); Hurwitz, 74
Georgetown L J at 82-93 (cited in note 10); Earl W. Kintner and Joseph P. Bauer, Anti-
trust Exemptions for Private Requests for Governmental Action: A Critical Analysis of the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 17 UC Davis L Rev 549, 570-71 (1984); Note, 11 Hastings
Const L Q at 339, 349-50 (cited in note 38) (analyzing statements in California Motor
Transport supporting the view that judicial process is more subject to injury from peti-
tioning).
'o 490 US 365 (1991).
" Id at 367-69.
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test.52 The Court also noted the difficulty of proving subjective
intent in cases of this nature. 53
2. The lower courts' responses.
The circuit courts responded differently to what they per-
ceived as an unclear standard for identifying sham suits, develop-
ing three positions in all. At one extreme, some courts held that
no meritorious suit could be deemed a sham. Both of the other
tests allowed judges to find some meritorious suits to be shams:
one viewed success on the merits as merely raising a rebuttable
presumption that the suit was not a sham, while the other em-
ployed economic analysis to help the court ascertain motive with-
out regard to the underlying merits of a case.
Most courts adopted an objective view and held, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, that successful litigation could never con-
stitute a sham.' Some courts extended this principle to express-
ly protect suits that "even if ultimately unsuccessful, do not lack
a reasonable basis in fact or law."55 This approach seems to be a
logical extension of the prior Supreme Court cases and, in fact,
foreshadows the Professional Real Estate Investors decision. It
also received support from academic literature on the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. 5
52 Id at 378-82.
Id at 383.
See, for example, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v Redd Home, Inc., 749 F2d
154, 161 (3d Cir 1984); Eden Hannon & Co. v Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F2d
556, 564-65 (4th Cir 1990); South Dakota v Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 880 F2d
40, 54 (8th Cir 1989); Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v Professional Real Estate Inves.
tors, Inc., 944 F2d 1525, 1530 (9th Cir 1991), aff'd, Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc.
v Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 113 S Ct 1920 (1993); Hydro-Tech Corp. v
Sundstrand Corp., 673 F2d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir 1982); McGuire Oil Co. v Mapco, Inc.,
958 F2d 1552, 1560 (11th Cir 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 986 F2d 444 (11th Cir 1993);
Federal Prescription Service, Inc. v American Pharmaceutical Assoc., 663 F2d 253, 262-63,
265 (DC Cir 1981); Southern Pacific Communications Co. v AT&T, 556 F Supp 825, 870-
71 (D DC 1983).
as McGuire Oil, 958 F2d at 1560 n 12. See also Opdyke Investment Co. v City of
Detroit, 883 F2d 1265, 1273 (6th Cir 1989); First American Title Co. v South Dakota Land
Title Assoc., 714 F2d 1439, 1447-48 (8th Cir 1983); Alexander v National Farmers Org.,
687 F2d 1173, 1200 (8th Cir 1982). See also Omni Resource Development Corp. v Conoco,
Inc., 739 F2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir 1984) (holding a suit obtaining a preliminary injunction
not to be a sham, regardless of the final outcome).
See Hurwitz, 74 Georgetown L J at 104-05 (cited in note 10); Handler and De Sevo,
6 Cardozo L Rev at 30-31 (cited in note 10); Kintner and Bauer, 17 UC Davis L Rev at
576-79 (cited in note 49); Note, 86 Harv L Rev at 730-31 (cited in note 15); Note, 11
Hastings Coast L Q at 345-46 (cited in note 38). See generally Comment, Meritorious
Litigation as a Section 2 Violation-In re Burlington Northern, Inc. Broadens Noerr-
Pennington's Sham Exception, 74 Iowa L Rev 271 (1988). But see Phillip E. Areeda and
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While other courts held that meritorious litigation could be a
sham,57 their position did not greatly diverge from that of courts
employing a more objective test. These cases typically took the
view that "when a lawsuit raises a legal issue of genuine sub-
stance, it raises a rebuttable presumption that it is a serious
attempt to obtain a judgment on the merits instead of a mere
sham or harassment.""8 Although the difference between a pure-
ly objective test and a rebuttable presumption may appear slight,
it is the key to understanding Professional Real Estate Investors
and its implications. Even when courts create a rebuttable pre-
sumption against sham litigation for successful cases, it still sig-
nifies that courts are willing to investigate the subjective intent
of the party that brought the suit. Such an inquiry, by implica-
tion, would be even more likely when the litigation is ultimately
unsuccessful. While this Comment argues below that considering
subjective intent is precisely what the courts should avoid do-
ing,59 the important point at present is that the subjective
test-which the Supreme Court later rejected-allowed a specu-
lative inquiry for shams that could override the objective evi-
dence of merit which will usually be before the court anyway. 0
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Appli-
cation 21 (Little, Brown, Supp 1987) (advocating a "strong presumption, rather than a
categorical rule, that successful litigation cannot be a sham"); Bien, 16 USF L Rev at 56-
57 (cited in note 38) (favoring a test based on a party's subjective intent).
' See In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 822 F2d 518, 528 (5th Cir 1987); Associated
Radio Service Co. v Page Airways, Inc., 624 F2d 1342, 1358 (5th Cir 1980); Westmac, Inc.
v Smith, 797 F2d 313, 318 (6th Cir 1986); Sunergy Communities, Inc. v Aristek Properties,
Ltd., 535 F Supp 1327, 1331 (D Colo 1982) ("Success is, in any event, only one factor to
consider in determining whether an action is a 'sham.'"). Some courts have focused on the
intent of the party bringing the suit rather than the suit's objective merit, thereby implic-
itly allowing otherwise meritorious litigation to be judged shams. See Coastal States
Marketing, Inc. v Hunt, 694 F2d 1358, 1372 (5th Cir 1983); Greenwood Utilities Commis-
sion v Mississippi Power Co., 751 F2d 1484, 1498 n 9 (5th Cir 1985); Mark Aero, Inc. v
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 580 F2d 288, 297 (8th Cir 1978); Handgards, Inc. v Ethicon,
Inc., 601 F2d 986, 994-96 (9th Cir 1979); Aloha Airlines, Inc. v Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
349 F Supp 1064, 1065, 1068 (D Hawaii 1972) (holding a valid cause of action was stated
although the only allegations were of anticompetitive "intent and purpose").
"8 Westmac, 797 F2d at 318. See also Burlington Northern, 822 F2d at 528 ("[S]uccess
on the merits does not necessarily preclude an antitrust plaintiff from proving that the
defendant's earlier litigation activities were sham."); Clipper Exxpress v Rocky Mountain
Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F2d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir 1982) ("[Wlhile the success or fail-
ure of the protests is not singularly determinative of a party's intent, this Circuit regards
such success or failure as indicative of a party's intent."); Handgards, 601 F2d at 996 ("[A]
patentee's infringement suit is presumptively in good faith and.., can be rebutted only
by clear and convincing evidence."). For commentary supporting this position, see Areeda
and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law at 21 (cited in note 56).
See text accompanying notes 106-15.
' Courts generally engage in multiple determinations of "merit." These include deter-
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The economic-analysis version of the sham test was proposed
in Grip-Pak, Inc. v Illinois Tool Works, Inc.61 There Judge
Posner presented a unique test by which predatory litigation,
even if meritorious, could be a sham for purposes of Noerr. The
prototype of this action is a case that is "not wholly groundless
[but] would never be sued on for [its] own sake; the stakes, dis-
counted by the probability of winning, would be too low to repay
the investment in litigation." 2 This decision, like all others di-
vorcing the sham determination from the objective merits of the
case, has been rejected by Professional Real Estate Investors.
However, Grip-Pak alone provides a possible, although probably
costly, alternative test grounded in measurable factors. Even so,
the test is not truly objective; a complete accounting of both the
costs and benefits of a suit would call for subjective valuations.
3. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v NLRB.
The Supreme Court ruled on sham suits in one other context
prior to Professional Real Estate Investors when it decided Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v NLRB.' This decision is very sig-
nificant both because it endorses the objective test for sham de-
terminations and also because it demonstrates a situation other
than an antitrust case in which the implications of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine may appropriately be applied.
Bill Johnson's began as an unfair labor practice action
against a restaurant in which the plaintiff, a former employee,
alleged that she was fired because of her attempts to organize a
union at the restaurant." After the firing, some of the employ-
mining whether a claim has been stated under Rule 12(b)(6), whether summary judgment
is appropriate, and, ultimately, who should win on the merits. This Comment argues that
in the economic regulation context the objective test for sanctionability under Rule 11 is
the most relevant inquiry. See text accompanying notes 106-15, 119-22. For an example of
a court making both Rule 11 and sham determinations, see Harris Custom Builders, Inc. v
Hoffneyer, 834 F Supp 256, 261-63 (N D Ill 1993).
61 694 F2d 466 (7th Cir 1982).
' Id at 472. The scenario that this opinion envisions is a case where "the plaintiff
wants to hurt a competitor not by getting a judgment against him, which would be a
proper objective, but just by the maintenance of the suit, regardless of its outcome." Id. In
other words, it suggests weighing the net value of the suit against the expected costs of
the suit. For an analysis of the Grip-Pak decision, see Hurwitz, 74 Georgetown L J at 105-
08 (cited in note 10); Handler and De Sevo, 6 Cardozo L Rev at 33-40 (cited in note 10);
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Developments in the Noerr Doctrine, 56 Antitrust L J 361, 364
(1987). For an endorsement of the Grip-Pak approach, see Kintner and Bauer, 17 UC
Davis L Rev at 572-73 (cited in note 49).
63 461 US 731 (1983).
" Id at 733.
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ees picketed the restaurant, and the owner responded with a
lawsuit alleging that the picketers had harassed customers,
blocked the entrance and exit to the'restaurant, and created a
threat to public safety.65 The fired employee then filed a second
unfair labor practice charge based in part on the employer's law-
suit.66 The NLRB ordered the restaurant owner to withdraw the
allegedly retaliatory lawsuit.
The Court was thus faced with the question of whether the
lawsuit was filed against the employee in retaliation for the ear-
lier charges and, if so, whether this was an unfair labor practice.
The Court held that "[tihe filing and prosecution of a well-found-
ed lawsuit may not be enjoined as an unfair labor practice, even
if it would not have been commenced but for the plaintiff's desire
to retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights protected
by the [National Labor Relations] Act."' The Court analogized
this case to the Noerr-Pennington line, especially California Mo-
tor Transport; in doing so it looked primarily to the First Amend-
ment aspect of these cases.69
4. Professional Real Estate Investors.
In 1993, the Court finally settled on a standard for making
sham determinations in the antitrust context, unequivocally
showing its allegiance to objective determinations of intent in
Professional Real Estate Investors."0 Unlike many of the deci-
sions since Noerr, the Court primarily emphasized the aspect of
Noerr that stressed the proper functioning of government.
Professional Real Estate Investors involved a copyright in-
fringement suit by Columbia and other motion picture studios
against a hotel that rented movie videodiscs for in-room view-
ing.7 ' The hotel filed an antitrust counterclaim charging that
Columbia's suit was a sham and that it represented an attempt
to restrain trade. 2 After reviewing the entire Noerr-Pennington
line of cases, the Court concluded that it was compelled "to reject
a purely subjective definition of 'sham,'" for "despite whatever
' Id at 733-34.
6 Id at 734-35.
67 Id at 737.
' Id at 743. Justice Brennan, the only Justice not joining the eight-member majority
opinion, did not dispute this part of the holding. See id at 750 (Brennan concurring).
69 Id at 741-44.
70 113 S Ct at 1926.
71 Id at 1923.
72 Id at 1923-24.
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'superficial certainty' it might provide, a subjective standard
would utterly fail to supply 'real intelligible guidance.' 73
The Court then put forward a two-part definition of a sham.
First, a sham suit would have to be "objectively baseless in the
sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect suc-
cess on the merits."74 Second, and less important for the purpos-
es of this Comment, the baseless lawsuit would have to conceal
"an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships
of a competitor."75 Though the Court could have preserved some
subjective element in the sham determination by adopting or
modifying the "rebuttable presumption" approach or the Seventh
Circuit's economic analysis, it chose to reject completely any
subjective determination.
Applying its newly announced test, the Court borrowed lan-
guage from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, a source that it
had not previously mentioned in the sham context. The Court
found that the copyright action was "arguably 'Warranted by
existing law' or at the very least was based on an objectively
'good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law."'
76
The Court thus analogized the sham question to the Rule 11
inquiry. However, it acknowledged only one aspect of the Rule.
The test failed to mention the second prong of Rule 11, which
deals with suits "interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation."
77
The Court's opinion contains three possible justifications for
the objective test (beyond consistency with precedent and adher-
ence to the original principles of Noerr).7' First, the Court exten-
sively discussed the parallels between sham suits and the tort of
malicious prosecution, concluding that, if this tort were success-
fully defended against, "a reasonable litigant in the defendant's
position could realistically expect success on the merits." 79 An
objective determination will thus lead to greater foreseeabili-
ty-both with respect to the outcomes of suits and anticipation of
7' Id at 1928, quoting Allied Tube, 486 US at 508 n 10.
' Id at 1928.
7' Id at 1928, quoting Noerr, 365 US at 144.
's Id at 1930-31, quoting FRCP 11.
77 FRCP 11.
78 These three justifications are discussed in greater detail below. See text accompa-
nying notes 106-15.
79 113 S Ct at 1929-30.
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whether certain behavior is likely to lead to the filing of a suit by
a competitor. Second, given the nature of antitrust liability,
which includes treble damages, there are concerns about a possi-
ble chilling effect on meritorious litigation if Sherman Act liabili-
ty may be imposed on objectively well-grounded suits." Finally,
the Court appeared to be concerned about the general line-draw-
ing problems of subjective determinations and the potential in-
consistency they engender.8 '
II. THE CURRENT APPLICATION OF RULE 11 IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS
In order to appreciate the implications of the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, particularly since Professional Real Estate
Investors has now drawn a parallel between determining shams
and sanctioning parties under rules of procedure, it is necessary
to examine the current state of Rule 11 jurisprudence. This Sec-
tion discusses the two prongs of Rule 11 and the ways in which
courts have imposed sanctions under each of them. It also ad-
dresses the changes to Rule 11 that became effective on Decem-
ber 1, 1993.
A. The Two Prongs of Rule 11
Rule 11, as worded when Professional Real Estate Investors
was decided, provided that any "pleading, motion, and other
paper of a party" must be
to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry.., well grounded in fact
and [ ] warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
and... interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
See Comment, 74 Iowa L Rev at 283-84 (cited in note 56); Hurwitz, 74 Georgetown
L J at 105 (cited in note 10); Handler and De Sevo, 6 Cardozo L Rev at 13, 30-32 (cited in
note 10).
There is also a concern about chilling constitutionally protected petitioning activity.
This could occur to the extent that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine defines the scope of
First Amendment protection. In other words, if "non-sham" is equivalent to "constitution-
ally protected," then discouraging non-sham suits would restrain the legitimate uses of
the right to petition. This is perhaps yet another reason for favoring objective determina-
tions. See Bien, 16 USF L Rev at 86 (cited in note 38) (arguing that uncertainty due to
the lack of a definite rule has a chilling effect); Balmer, 29 Buff L Rev at 60-62 (cited in
note 15) (cautioning courts to "err on the side of protecting first amendment values").
81 113 S Ct at 1927.
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harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation."
The rule further required the courts to "impose... an appropri-
ate sanction" for violations.'
On its face, Rule 11 appears to have two parts that trigger
sanctions. The courts of appeals have, in fact, acknowledged the
existence of two prongs: the objective prong, which sanctions
suits lacking a reasonable basis in fact and law, and the subjec-
tive prong, under which a suit brought under an improper intent
will be sanctioned. These are known, respectively, as the
"frivolousness clause" and the "improper purpose clause."'
There is, however, some dispute about the specific requirements
of each prong.
Before going into the details of Rule 11 interpretation, it is
necessary to address the relevant recent amendments to Rule
11.85 The new version of the rule separates the two prongs of
the old rule into different subsections, thus highlighting the fact
that the rule may be violated in two ways.86 The relevant parts
of the second section, entitled "Representations to Court" are:,
82 FRCP 11 (1992).
' Id.
' Zaldivar v City of Los Angeles, 780 F2d 823, 830-31 (9th Cir 1986), abrogated on
other grounds by Cooter & Gell v Hartmarx Corp., 496 US 384 (1990). See also Herron v
Jupiter Transportation Co., 858 F2d 332, 335 (6th Cir 1988); Brown v Federation of State
Medical Boards, 830 F2d 1429, 1435-36 (7th Cir 1987), abrogated on other grounds by
Mars Steel Corp. v Continental Bank NA., 880 F2d 928 (7th Cir 1989); Mitford v Marsh,
972 F2d 1341, 1992 US App LEXIS 30070, *9-10 (9th Cir) (table); Adam H. Bloomenstein,
Developing Standards for the Imposition of Sanctions Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 21 Akron L Rev 289, 296-305 (1988).
Some courts have found three prongs by dividing the frivolousness clause into a
grounded in fact prong and a warranted by existing law prong. See Westmoreland v CBS,
Inc., 770 F2d 1168, 1174 (DC Cir 1985); Kunstler v Britt, 914 F2d 505, 514-18 (4th Cir
1990); Thomas v Capital Security Services, Inc., 812 F2d 984, 988 (5th Cir 1987). These
courts distinguish these two objective prongs from the subjective improper purpose clause
in the same way as courts using a two-prong analysis. Since all these courts make the
same objective/subjective distinction, their treatment of Rule 11 is identical for the pur-
poses of this Comment.
,' The amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect automati-
cally on December 1, 1993 when Congress adjourned without adopting proposed changes.
See Mary Hull and Ann Pelham, New Federal Rules Catch Judges, Lawyers Off-Guard,
Texas Lawyer I (Dec 6, 1993). At any rate, the proposed changes, which Congress may yet
pass, focus on discovery rules rather than on Rule 11. See Randall Samborn, New Discov-
ery Rules Take Effect; Bill to Stop Change Dies, Natl L J 3 (Dec 6, 1993). Congressional
action on Rule 11 faltered earlier. See House Votes to Block Change in Federal Discovery
Rule, Liability Week (Nov 8, 1993).
88 The new version also contains two other provisions, requiring that "allegations and
other factual contentions have evidentiary support" and that "denials of factual conten-
tions are warranted on the evidence." FRCP 11(b)(3)-(4).
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By presenting to the court... a pleading, written motion, or
other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying
that...
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation; [and that]
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
law.8
7
This change is unlikely to affect substantially the analysis of this
Comment.
The provision of the rule regarding sanctions was also
changed. Whereas the old rule provided that a court "shall im-
pose.., an appropriate sanction,"' the new version of the rule
states that "the court may... impose an appropriate sanc-
tion." 9 This additional element of discretion may not change the
practical effects of the rule very much since the "appropriate
sanction" language in both rules is very malleable anyway."
However, to the extent that this change does introduce more
overt discretion to Rule 11 sanctions, it recognizes that sanctions
may not be appropriate in all contexts. This Comment argues
that sanctions are not appropriate in the antitrust context absent
a violation of the objective prong of the rule.
B. Sanctions Under Rule 11
Current Rule 11 jurisprudence is still an appropriate point of
departure, especially since Professional Real Estate Investors now
specifically tracks the objective, "frivolousness" inquiry called for
by subsection (b)(2) of the Rule, and does not mention the subjec-
8 FRCP 11(b).
8 FRCP 11 (1992).
FRCP 11(c) (emphasis added).
'o These changes, along with a newly-adopted safe harbor and new restrictions on
cost-shifting, may, however, lead to a decline in the use of Rule 11. See Robert E.
Bartkus, Rule 11's New Teeth Have a Broader Bite, NJ L J 11 (Dec 20, 1993); Robert J.
Giuffra, Jr., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1993 Amendments, NY L J 1 (May 10,
1993); Marcia M. McBrien, Magistrate Judge Highlights Changes to Federal Rules, Mich
Lawyers Weekly JA (Oct 18, 1993); Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Rule Revisions a Mixed Bag,
Natl L J S14 (Aug 23, 1993); Carl Tobias, New Rule in Need of Trial Run, Natl L J 15
(June 21, 1993).
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rive or "improper purpose" inquiry contained in subsection (b)(1)
of the Rule.
There has been much more convergence in courts' views of
the nature of the frivolousness clause than of the improper pur-
pose clause of Rule 11. The frivolousness inquiry has almost
always been examined objectively: courts have inquired only as to
whether the motion or pleading was objectively valueless, with-
out looking at the intent of the party submitting the argument.9'
This consensus among the circuits-reinforced by the 1993
amendments 92 and embraced by Professional Real Estate Inves-
tors-means that an objectively frivolous suit is always
sanctionable under Rule 11, and is a sham if it directly interferes
with the business relationships of a competitor.
The improper purpose standard, on the other hand, has been
applied in a number of different ways. It appears from the lan-
guage of the rule that the courts must at least undertake to ap-
proximate, if not to reconstruct, the intent of the filing party.
This, of course, is to some extent what the Noerr-Pennington
cases are all about: California Motor Transport, for instance,
spoke of "a purpose to deprive the competitors of meaningful
access to the agencies and courts."93 Professional Real Estate
Investors can thus be seen as a decision declining to inquire into
the parties' intent, substituting an objective baselessness test
instead.
With respect to Rule 11, however, the appellate courts have
taken both tacks. Some have applied an objective baselessness
standard for finding improper purpose clause violations, while
others have focused on subjective intent. Even those courts ap-
91 See Lancellotti v Fay, 909 F2d 15, 19 (1st Cir 1990) ("Put bluntly, a pure heart no
longer excuses an empty head."); Eastway Construction Corp. v City of New York, 762 F2d
243, 253 (2d Cir 1985) ("Simply put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe
harbor it once did."); Stevens v Lawyers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 789 F2d 1056,
1060 (4th Cir 1986); INVST Financial Group, Inc. v Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., 815 F2d
391, 401 (6th Cir 1987); Rodgers v Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 596 F Supp 13, 28 (N D
Ill 1984); Zaldivar, 780 F2d at 829; Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v Burroughs Corp.,
801 F2d 1531, 1537-38 (9th Cir 1986). See also Bloomenstein, 21 Akron L Rev at 294-96
(cited in note 84); Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 Hofstra L Rev 499, 525-30 (1986); William W.
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv L Rev 1013, 1016 (1988).
' See Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments to FRCP 11. For example, the
Committee observed that "lairguments for extensions, modifications, or reversals of
existing law... do not violate subdivision (b)(2) provided they are 'nonfrivolous.' This
establishes an objective standard intended to eliminate any 'empty-head pure-heart'
justification for patently frivolous arguments." Id.
' 404 US at 512 (emphasis added).
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plying the objective baselessness standard have taken divergent
approaches. Some merely hold that a case's lack of merit is itself
sanctionable harassment under the improper purpose clause.'
This approach, however, essentially just uses one part of Rule 11
to satisfy the other part. The fact that the two parts must be
linked does not show what sort of test should be used in cases
where only one prong, improper intent, comes into question.
Other courts have gone further and applied an objective test of
bad faith.95 These courts, of course, are unlikely to be affected
by the Professional Real Estate Investors decision because they
already use the same test for Rule 11 sanctions that is now re-
quired for sham determinations. Thus, there will not be cases
that meet one test while failing the other.
Other jurisdictions, however, favor subjective determinations
of sanctionability. Some courts have held cases sanctionable even
when the suits were objectively meritorious or at least adequate-
ly based in fact and law. 6 As this Comment argues, these cases
are likely inconsistent with the sham test laid down in Profes-
sional Real Estate Investors.
III. THE PROFESSIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTORS-RULE 11
TENSION IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION
The Supreme Court linked the sham standard announced in
Professional Real Estate Investors very closely to a Rule 11-like
test of objective baselessness. Yet the Court accounted for only
one part of Rule 11 in its decision. While this makes the sham
test very convenient for the courts, it creates a potential problem
in antitrust contexts, depending on a court's approach to Rule 11.
9' See Markwell v County of Bexar, 878 F2d 899, 903 (5th Cir 1989); Mitford, 972 F2d
1341, 1992 US App LEXIS 30070, *11.
"2 See Westlake North Property Owners Association v City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F2d
1301, 1307 (9th Cir 1990) (holding a complaint with an objectively reasonable basis in law
was not frivolous, and therefore not sanctionable under "improper purpose" clause); Lieb v
Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F2d 151, 157 (3d Cir 1986) ("The pleader may not escape
liability because he did not intend to bring about additional delay or expense."); Fahrenz v
Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 F2d 207, 210 (4th Cir 1988) (Courts must judge conduct
"under an objective standard of reasonableness rather than assessing subjective intent.");
Di Silvestro v United States, 767 F2d 30, 32-33 (2d Cir 1985) (finding bad intent in the fil-
ing of a claim barred by res judicata and court injunction). See also Bloomenstein, 21
Akron L Rev at 318-20 (cited in note 84).
9 See Pathe Computer Control Systems Corp. v Kinmont Industries, Inc., 955 F2d 94,
97 (1st Cir 1992); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v Alla Medical Services, Inc., 855 F2d 1470,
1476-77 (9th Cir 1988); Ballentine v Taco Bell Corp., 135 FRD 117, 122 (E D NC 1991).
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A. The Problem: Non-sham Suits Brought to Harass or Delay
Imagine a case in which a claim, whether a complaint, coun-
terclaim, or other pleading, filed by X Corp against its competi-
tor, Y Corp, was objectively based in law, yet filed for the purpose
of harassing or interfering with Y Corp. In response, Y Corp then
alleges that X Corp's action is a violation of the antitrust laws
and not entitled to immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine because it is a sham. This scenario is, in fact, very similar
to the situation facing the Court in Professional Real Estate In-
vestors, except that it was never alleged that Columbia's case "in-
volved misrepresentations" or lacked "probable cause." Instead, it
was merely alleged that Columbia "did not honestly believe that
the infringement claim was meritorious."97 Given the Court's
holding in Professional Real Estate Investors, however, it is inevi-
table that future litigants will try to fit their allegations of sham
within the more narrow exception by alleging baselessness rather
than wrongful intent.98 If Y Corp fails to show that X Corp's suit
is a sham, there may be a situation in which X Corp will be ex-
empt from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
yet still be violating the improper purpose prong of Rule 11 un-
der a subjective-intent analysis."
Such an outcome is problematic in two respects. First, it
results in the same lawsuit being legitimate in one sense, since it
is not a sham, while illegitimate in another, if it is found to be
harassing or unduly dilatory. While this may not have occurred
in the past, Professional Real Estate Investors tied the two tests
so closely together that such an outcome is now a real and trou-
bling possibility. Because the effect of both tests is the
same-they determine which suits should not have been filed-it
makes'little sense to sanction suits inconsistently.
" Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S Ct at 1925. Had there been actual fraud,
the petitioning activity would not have been protected-but not because of any bad intent
prong to the sham exception. It would instead have fallen under .the analysis of Walker
Process, 382 US at 173-74, which makes fraud and other illegal acts during petitioning a
valid basis for antitrust liability. See note 38.
" See, for example, Liberty Lake Investments, Inc. v Magnuson, 12 F3d 155, 1993 US
App LEXIS 32686, *5-6 (9th Cir).
" This assumes that "to harass," as used in Rule 11, can be equated with a purpose
"to interfere directly with the business relationships," as required by the original defini-
tion of a sham. See FRCP 11(b)(1); Noerr, 365 US at 144. This is, however, an easy case to
make, especially given the interchangeability with which the courts have used these and
similar terms in the Noerr-Pennington cases. See Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S
Ct at 1929; California Motor Transport, 404 US at 512-13; Westmac, 797 F2d at 318;
Burlington Northern, 822 F2d at 528; McGuire Oil, 958 F2d at 1559-60.
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More importantly, compelling rationales suggest that the
sham determination should be limited to an objective inquiry in
the first place. To the extent that the justifications for an objec-
tive test of shams are valid, they should apply equally to the
inquiry required by Rule 11.00 Since Noerr and its exception
have effectively transformed antitrust law into a mechanism for
policing access to government bodies, including the courts,1°1
the same policy considerations should underlie liability determi-
nations in Rule 11 situations, since this rule is also an instru-
ment for policing conduct before and access to the courts. Any
application of Rule 11 which conflicts with the objective sham
determination would undermine the policies behind the adoption
of this test for policing litigation between parties in antitrust
cases. Furthermore, a conflicting Rule 11 standard may discour-
age parties from pursuing claims that are deemed permissible in
the antitrust context for fear of violating a standard that is not
specifically tailored to their situation.
B. Limiting the Application of Rule 11 in Antitrust Litigation
To restore consistency to the policing of litigation, either the
standard for determining shams or the standard for imposing
Rule 11 sanctions should be modified. While this Comment ar-
gues that an objective test is appropriate whenever the govern-
ment, and especially a court, acts as an economic regulator, Pro-
fessional Real Estate Investors makes an objective standard ap-
propriate, at a minimum, in the antitrust context. Because the
Court has clearly articulated the test for the sham exception, and
because the objective test is supported by valid policy consider-
ations, Rule 11 should give way. Both the interest in procedural
consistency and substantive policy considerations support limit-
ing Rule 11 inquiries in the antitrust context to objective deter-
minations of merit or the reasonable chance of success. In effect,
the objective Rule 11 analysis presented in Professional Real
Estate Investors should be the only test used to distinguish per-
missible from sanctionable claims.
As an initial matter, such a modification of Rule 11 will not
be overly problematic. Rule 11 is a general policing mechanism,
'® See text accompanying notes 77-81, 106-15.
.01 By opening the door to antitrust liability, the sham exception has the practical ef-
fect of deciding what suits are properly brought and discouraging those that are not. See
Comment, 74 Iowa L Rev at 282-84 (cited in note 56); Fischel, 45 U Chi L Rev at 94-96
(cited in note 10); Handler and De Sevo, 6 Cardozo L Rev at 13 (cited in note 10).
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but it is confronted here with context-specific reasons for alter-
ation. This argument is analogous to the preference for specific
provisions over general ones in statutory construction."°2 Profes-
sional Real Estate Investors should be read as a specific directive
to police litigation in the antitrust context with an objective base-
lessness inquiry. This ought to trump any other concerns about
policing litigation in general. Other concerns are at stake, of
course: parties must not be allowed to misuse the judicial system,
as this would compromise respect for the courts and undermine
the integrity of the judicial process. But fraud or perjury are still
punishable notwithstanding this proposal, both with antitrust
liability"3 and with other mechanisms that this Comment does
not suggest altering, such as contempt sanctions or criminal
liability. Indeed, a more consistent and context-sensitive ap-
proach to sanctioning ought to increase confidence in the judicial
system, especially for antitrust litigants.
This argument is even stronger if Professional Real Estate
Investors is viewed as an extension of the proper-functioning-of-
government concern of Noerr. The Professional Real Estate Inves-
tors opinions did, in fact, stress the need to ensure the proper
functioning of government institutions over the First Amendment
concerns that were more prominent in California Motor Trans-
port. °4 In addition to quoting Noerr to support an objective test
for determining shams, the Professional Real Estate Investors
Court stressed that it had, in Noerr, "reasoned that the Sherman
Act does not punish 'political activity' through which 'the peo-
ple..., freely inform the government of their wishes.""'
The "function" of government in the antitrust context is the
Court acting as economic regulator, and the efficiency of that
function is generally controlled by mechanisms such as Rule 11
or liability for such things as the filing of sham suits. Profession-
al Real Estate Investors is really a specific directive that courts
ought to use an objective, outcome-oriented analysis of intent
whenever they act as economic regulators.
10 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand L Rev 395, 405 (1950); Cass
R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution 151 (Harvard, 1990).
" See note 38.
.04 See text accompanying notes 30-31.
10" Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S Ct at 1926, quoting Noerr, 365 US at 137.
In relying on this part of Noerr, the Court implicitly rejected the view, advanced by some
commentators, that the protection of petitioning activity was the principal concern of the
Noerr line of cases. See Fischel, 45 U Chi L Rev at 82-83 (cited in note 10); Handler and
De Sevo, 6 Cardozo L Rev at 3-5, 12 (cited in note 10).
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C. The Rationales Underlying an Objective Determination of
Shams
The arguments favoring an objective regulation of suits rais-
ing antitrust implications have already been sketched out.06 In
addition to the benefit of consistency between sham determina-
tions and Rule 11 sanctions, there are three reasons to prefer the
Professional Real Estate Investors test to the subjective in-
tent-Rule 11 test favored by some of the circuits.
1. Efficiency of the courts.
Efficiency concerns support an objective test for determining
whether a party should be sanctioned under Rule 11. In antitrust
actions, a subjective test of a lawsuit's propriety would often force
a court to evaluate the intent of a large corporation, since these
suits generally involve corporations. Corporations are unlikely to
exhibit any consistent institutional intent, because they are
large, have many individual speakers, actors, and decision mak-
ers, and have many motivations for any action, whether litigation
or otherwise.' 7 Judge Posner has noted that, because of these
factors, "[ilt is extraordinarily difficult to ascertain the intent of a
large corporation by the methods of litigation," and that "[a]ny
doctrine that relies upon proof of intent is going to be applied
erratically at best."' 8 Furthermore, it is very easy for the side
alleging the violation to present some evidence of an intent to ha-
rass since the opposing parties in all of these cases are, after all,
business competitors. 9
As desirable as objective tests may be in general, the argu-
ment for them is even stronger in the antitrust-litigation context.
106 See text accompanying notes 79-81.
' Public choice theory analogously holds that "intent" is an incoherent concept when
applied to multi-member bodies and that such bodies' priorities "cycle" depending upon
who controls the agenda. See, for example, Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law
and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 40-42 (Chicago, 1991).
106 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 189-90 (Chicago, 1976)
(discussing the problems that arise when predatory pricing is defined in terms of the
seller's intent). See also Areeda and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law at 17 (cited in note 56)
(subjective inquiry is "hazardous and of doubtful utility" in most cases); Comment, 74
Iowa L Rev at 281-82 (cited in note 56); William G. Shepherd, Assessing "Predatory"
Actions by Market Shares and Selectivity, 31 Antitrust Bull 1, 17 (1986). But see Bien, 16
USF L Rev at 56-57 (cited in note 38).
Courts have also acknowledged this difficulty in antitrust cases. See, for example,
Grip-Pak, 694 F2d at 472; Greenwood Utilities Commission v Mississippi Power Co., 751
F2d 1484, 1498 & n 9 (5th Cir 1985); Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 US at 375, 383.
1" See Comment, 74 Iowa L Rev at 284-85 (cited in note 56).
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The choice here is not merely between reconstruction of a party's
intent and an objective determination of the potential merit of a
claim on its face. The question is whether it makes sense to add
the subjective inquiry to the objective one that the Supreme
Court has now required in these cases. So long as there is ade-
quate reason to believe that the objective test will yield accept-
able outcomes, it would be wasteful to engage in a subjective
inquiry as well."'
2. Discouraging meritorious claims.
A subjective inquiry might also have a chilling effect on mer-
itorious litigation. This problem has been noted in the context of
a subjective approach to sham determinations, where exposure to
antitrust liability, including treble damages, tends to magnify
this effect."' Rule 11 penalties are not likely to be as severe as
potential antitrust liability, but some chilling effect would still
occur. This is more true in antitrust cases than in other types of
cases because of the relative ease with which harassment can be
alleged.12 This factor produces more uncertainty for parties
contemplating lawsuits, and hence might deter some suits that
would be filed if the parties could foresee how their actions would
be judged.
3. Expectations of the parties.
The final advantage of an objective test is that it is more
likely to coincide with all parties' reasonable expectations. An
objective test is simply more predictable." 3 The Supreme Court
even alluded to this argument in Professional Real Estate Inves-
tors itself."' Predictability will help potential plaintiffs deter-
mine their likely exposure to sanctions or antitrust liability, and
will help potential defendants better anticipate lawsuits and
tailor their actions accordingly.
1 Two commentators have also noted that a system in which every sham determina-
tion turned on the intent of the party would necessitate a jury decision in every case,
another costly enterprise for the courts. Handler and De Sevo, 6 Cardozo L Rev at 39-40
(cited in note 10).
. See id at 39; Hurwitz, 74 Georgetown L J at 105 (cited in note 10); Comment, 74
Iowa L Rev at 282-84 (cited in note 56); Balmer, 29 Buff L Rev at 68 (cited in note 15);
Blecher and Bennett, 26 Mercer L Rev at 479-81 (cited in note 9).
1 See text accompanying note 109.
1 Comment, 74 Iowa L Rev at 282-84.
114 113 S Ct at 1930.
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Noerr-Pennington suits often arise from non-antitrust mat-
ters-for example, copyright, trademark, or patent infringement,
violation of fiduciary duties, or other tort or contract ac-
tions-where the antitrust allegations are raised as a counter-
claim or affirmative defense."1 Parties will naturally want to
know the likely future consequences of their business decisions.
To judge, even roughly, the possibility of a competitor filing a
lawsuit, parties must assess the disincentives to filing suit that
the other party faces. These disincentives include potential anti-
trust liability if the suit is found to be a sham, as well as the
threat of Rule 11 sanctions. If the parties can be sure that a
court will impose such liability on the basis of objective determi-
nations of merit rather than on the basis of subjective inquiries,
the parties are far more likely to be able to predict a court's like-
ly decision. In turn, this helps parties make accurate business
decisions ex ante.
D. The Grip-Pak Alternative
The Grip-Pak decision".6 presents a possible alternative to
the approach recommended in this Comment. The rebuttable pre-
sumption that a successful lawsuit is not a sham..7 could be
combined with the Seventh Circuit's extension of liability to pred-
atory litigation."8 This hybrid approach could claim to be an
alternative objective test, one that weighs the costs and benefits
to a party-or a reasonable litigant in the same situation-of
bringing a suit.
This approach, however, would not solve the problems creat-
ed by purely subjective tests because the alternative test would
itself depend heavily on subjective assessments of the costs and
benefits of the litigation in question. The determination of wheth-
er a party had in fact brought a suit as a sham would depend on
the party's own valuations of various methods and outcomes in a
particular suit. This approach, although most likely to lead to the
results desired by the Seventh Circuit, still requires an analysis
of a complex entity's decision-making process, which is one of the
major problems with a subjective approach.
... See Handler and De Sevo, 6 Cardozo L Rev at 26-28 (cited in note 10).
" See text accompanying notes 61-62.
117 See, for example, Areeda and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law at 21 (cited in note 56).
" Grip-Pak, 694 F2d at 472. See also text accompanying notes 61-62. For commen-
tary on this decision, see note 62.
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Alternatively, if the test is simplified to require only a com-
parison of the costs of litigation and the damages sought, it fails
to include other legitimate short- and long-term benefits of win-
ning a suit, such as deterring future patent infringements. This
test would result in far too many findings of sham suits. An at-
tempt to measure these benefits objectively could well be prohibi-
tively difficult, given the information that would be necessary to
make such determinations. In any case, the attempt would cer-
tainly be much less efficient-without necessarily being any more
accurate-than an objective baselessness inquiry.
IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE OBJECTIVE BASELESSNESS
TEST
An inevitable question at this juncture is whether the objec-
tive test, which appears to work very well in the antitrust con-
text, should be extended to govern Rule 11 considerations in
other areas of the law. The answer to this question depends to a
significant extent on which of Noerr's two rationales served as
the basis for Professional Real Estate Investors.
A. First Amendment Right to Petition
This Comment has argued that Professional Real Estate
Investors was based on Noerr's proper-functioning-of-government
rationale."' If, however, Professional Real Estate Investors is a
decision about the First Amendment right to petition, which
many writers have argued is the true significance of the Noerr-
Pennington cases,' then its impact on Rule 11 jurisprudence
will be very far-reaching. Without pursuing this argument at
length, this Comment sketches its outlines.
Based on a right-to-petition reading of Professional Real
Estate Investors, it could be argued that the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine now protects all petitioning, at least before courts, that
is objectively well-based in fact and law. Such an interpretation
would mean that lawsuits could not be policed beyond an objec-
tive baselessness standard, since a party would have a right to
petition so long as that petition had an objective basis. This in-
119 See text accompanying notes 102-04.
'20 See Fischel, 45 U Chi L Rev at 94-104 (cited in note 10); Note, The Sham Exception
to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: A Commercial Speech Interpretation, 49 Brooklyn L Rev
573, 594-603 (1983); Balmer, 29 Buff L Rev at 61 (cited in note 15). For an overview of the
two rationales, see Handler and De Sevo, 6 Cardozo L Rev at 3-7; Hurwitz, 74
Georgetown L J at 78-80 (cited in note 10).
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terpretation would be especially true if the suit was ultimately
found to be meritorious. The problem then would no longer be
chilling meritorious lawsuits, but chilling constitutionally protect-
ed petitioning." Because an overly broad definition of "sham"
would threaten the valid exercise of First Amendment rights at
risk, any greater scope of sanctions would be prohibited.'
This logic would have to be extended to other areas of the
law as well, including Rule 11. It implies that the objective ap-
proach test for applying the improper purpose clause is constitu-
tionally mandated. At least two other areas of the law would also
be affected: the common law torts of malicious prosecution and
abuse of process. The Court in Professional Real Estate Investors
noted the similarity between these torts and the sham determi-
nation," as have other courts and commentators.n4 For the
same reason that Rule 11 would have to be modified, the require-
ments for these torts would have to be modified in any jurisdic-
tions that relied on subjective determinations of bad faith or
improper purposes.
Yet given the Court's emphasis on the proper-functioning-of-
government rationale for Noerr over the First Amendment issues,
it seems improbable that Professional Real Estate Investors was
meant to be a revision of an entire aspect of First Amendment ju-
risprudence. A uniform standard of protection for objectively
plausible claims may be a logical extension of the Court's hold-
ing, but it certainly is not mandated. The Noerr-Pennington cases
do, however, provide a guide to the applicability of the objective
baselessness standard. Such protection makes most sense, and
therefore may even be required, when a court is playing the role
of economic regulator. This extension of Professional Real Estate
Investors reflects concerns about chilling petitioning activity that
may be protected by the First Amendment but does not purport
121 See Balmer, 29 Buff L Rev at 60-62 (cited in note 15); Bien, 16 USF L Rev at 86
(cited in note 38); Handler and De Sevo, 6 Cardozo L Rev at 13, 39 (cited in note 10);
Note, 11 Hastings Const L Q at 332-36 (cited in note 38); Note, 86 Harv L Rev at 735
(cited in note 15).
12 Recently, one court held something nearly this broad. See Whelan v Abell, 827 F
Supp 801, 803 (D DC 1993), dismissed 1993 WL 410900 (DC Cir) (-Mhis Court can find no
basis to so narrowly limit the doctrine. Certainly, if a person has a protected right to
bring an objectively-based antitrust claim against a competitor, the same protection must
be afforded to others who bring other such objectively-based claims and allegations before
a government agency or court."). See also Computer Associates International, Inc. v
American Fundware, Inc., 831 F Supp 1516, 1523 (D Colo 1993).
'2' 113 S Ct at 1929.
14 See Grip-Pak, 694 F2d at 470-71; Whelan, 827 F Supp at 804. See generally Note,
86 Harv L Rev 715 (cited in note 15).
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to revise existing First Amendment law beyond the economic-
regulator context.
B. Extending the Proper-Functioning-of-Government Logic
If it is true that Professional Real Estate Investors rests on
the proper-functioning-of-government basis of Noerr, then the
logic of the case should be extended to functionally similar pro-
ceedings. Such proceedings would include cases that, like anti-
trust cases, are marked by particularly high subjective inquiry
costs, the need for predictability, and the fear of imposing a chill-
ing effect on meritorious suits through excessive deterrence. A
wide range of cases share these characteristics-especially the
latter two. Extending the logic of Professional Real Estate Inves-
tors to functionally similar proceedings would thus still call for a
broad application of the principle of objective determination of
non-meritorious litigation.
Three factors support the application of an objective test for
sham suits in the antitrust context: (1) the fact that courts per-
form an explicitly economic regulatory function in antitrust cases;
(2) the fact that parties to antitrust litigation are usually compet-
itors not only in litigation but also outside the courtroom, which
makes some harassing intent especially easy to infer; and (3) the
fact that, typically, at least one of the parties is a large enter-
prise or a corporation.
The courts' economic regulatory function is more reliably
carried out through objective tests of intent.' This is true be-
cause objective inquiries are more predictable, which better al-
lows parties to conform their behavior, and because the market-
place itself is outcome-oriented, allocating goods by a mechan-
ism-the price system-that is indifferent to intent. It makes
sense, then, that bad results-in this case meritless suits or coun-
terclaims-be punished, and not bad intent.
That parties deal repeatedly with one another both inside
and outside the courtroom also has an impact on the reliability of
a subjective standard. In any case where the parties are competi-
tors, allegations of subjective bad intent are easier to make and
corroborate.'26 Thus, the uncertainty of determining sanctions is
extended to more cases, and the chilling effect of this approach is
'25 See text accompanying notes 107-15.
m See text accompanying note 109. Antitrust is, of course, the prototypical case, as
the parties will always be economic competitors.
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magnified whenever the court undertakes a subjective inquiry.
Finally, in cases involving large enterprises, as opposed to indi-
viduals, subjective determinations of intent are more difficult. 2 7
Unfair labor practice litigation (to which the Supreme Court
analogized the Noerr doctrine) provides an example of a non-
antitrust area where these factors are present.'28 In these cas-
es, the courts help regulate the collective bargaining process
between businesses and their employees or their employees' un-
ions. These courts function much like economic regulators and
the parties certainly deal with each other repeatedly in an ad-
versarial or competitive manner. Both the businesses and the
unions are also large entities with multiple decision makers,
making determinations of an overall subjective intent very diffi-
cult. Many other situations would also be analogous, such as
breach of contract claims between corporate entities. In cases
bearing such a resemblance to antitrust cases, courts should
follow the reasoning of Professional Real Estate Investors and
impose Rule 11 sanctions only upon a showing that a party's
filing was objectively baseless.
CONCLUSION
Professional Real Estate Investors holds that whether a law-
suit constitutes a sham for Noerr-Pennington purposes depends
solely on whether it is objectively baseless. This decision, howev-
er, has an impact on areas of the law beyond the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. The extent to which Professional Real Es-
tate Investors affects other mechanisms that police access to the
courts depends on whether it is grounded in the right-to-petition
or the proper-functioning-of-government rationale of the original
Noerr case.
If it extends the right-to-petition analysis of Noerr, then
Professional Real Estate Investors effectively mandates an objec-
tive test of intent for all sanctioning mechanisms that police
access to the courts-not only Rule 11, but common law torts
such as malicious prosecution and abuse of process as well. While
it might seem extreme to ascribe such an effect to the case, Pro-
See text accompanying notes 107-09.
128 See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 US at 741-44.
The Professional Real Estate Investors analysis was, in fact, recently extended to
such a case. See Computer Associates International, 831 F Supp at 1521-23 (extending
Noerr-Pennington protection to an "unfair competition" counterclaim to a breach of con-
tract suit).
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fessional Real Estate Investors at a minimum creates a tension
with Rule 11 in antitrust law and related areas. To the extent
that an objective test is desirable due to considerations of effi-
ciency, predictability, and avoiding a chilling effect on meritori-
ous litigation, the reasoning of Professional Real Estate Investors
should be adopted for other Rule 11 proceedings that have func-
tionally similar elements.

